Perhaps the most dramatic paper that electrifyingly shook age-old perceptions was the one presented in 2004 by stalwart professors Belen Villalonga (Harvard Business School) and Raphael Amit (Wharton), who analysed “all” Fortune 500 firms and proved unequivocally that not only do the stock returns of family firms consistently show higher levels of risk, but also that “when ‘descendants’ (of founders or founding families) serve as
CEOs, firm value ‘is’ destroyed!” If one presumed that modern corporate governance norms were enough to mitigate the damage caused by family successors, Villalonga and Raphael prove further that descendant CEOs “destroy value whether or not the family has control-enhancing mechanisms.” While the most noted 2003 research by London Business School proffered that family businesses “risk their growth potential if they fail to recruit from outside,” most amusing was the Economist research at the turn of the century that commented how the death of a significant inside shareholder resulted in a shareholders’ wealth increase (“the larger the deceased’s shareholding, the bigger the subsequent rise!” ) Strangely, this finding gets humungous support from the subsequent benchmark 2005 research paper titled ‘Firm Performance...In Family Managed Firms’ by David Hillier (Leeds) and Patrick McColgan (Aberdeen), which documents positive stock price increases to the “announcement of the sudden death of a company’s founder executive.” But more seriously, they also indisputably brought out how family CEO successions are almost always followed by dramatic declines in not only stock performance, but most dangerously, even operating performance! Not surprisingly, the exits of family CEOs from family owned firms led to increases in operating performance, revenues, employment, stock value, but only if the new CEO being appointed was from outside the family! A fact vindicated a few years before in 2003 by the radical Pérez-González of Columbia Business School; and even by Professor Borokhovich of Cleveland University; and by Bath, Trygve, Schone of Institute of Social Research (Journal of Corporate Finance, 2005); Slovin (Louisiana University) and Sushka (Arizona University)... the list is so endless that it seems stupid to keep on repeating the same fact.
CEOs, firm value ‘is’ destroyed!” If one presumed that modern corporate governance norms were enough to mitigate the damage caused by family successors, Villalonga and Raphael prove further that descendant CEOs “destroy value whether or not the family has control-enhancing mechanisms.” While the most noted 2003 research by London Business School proffered that family businesses “risk their growth potential if they fail to recruit from outside,” most amusing was the Economist research at the turn of the century that commented how the death of a significant inside shareholder resulted in a shareholders’ wealth increase (“the larger the deceased’s shareholding, the bigger the subsequent rise!” ) Strangely, this finding gets humungous support from the subsequent benchmark 2005 research paper titled ‘Firm Performance...In Family Managed Firms’ by David Hillier (Leeds) and Patrick McColgan (Aberdeen), which documents positive stock price increases to the “announcement of the sudden death of a company’s founder executive.” But more seriously, they also indisputably brought out how family CEO successions are almost always followed by dramatic declines in not only stock performance, but most dangerously, even operating performance! Not surprisingly, the exits of family CEOs from family owned firms led to increases in operating performance, revenues, employment, stock value, but only if the new CEO being appointed was from outside the family! A fact vindicated a few years before in 2003 by the radical Pérez-González of Columbia Business School; and even by Professor Borokhovich of Cleveland University; and by Bath, Trygve, Schone of Institute of Social Research (Journal of Corporate Finance, 2005); Slovin (Louisiana University) and Sushka (Arizona University)... the list is so endless that it seems stupid to keep on repeating the same fact.For Complete IIPM Article, Click here
Source: IIPM Editorial, 2008
An IIPM and Management Guru Prof. Arindam Chaudhuri's Initiative
Source: IIPM Editorial, 2008
An IIPM and Management Guru Prof. Arindam Chaudhuri's Initiative
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Strategic Alliance / Consulting / Intellectual Tic-up Partners Arindam chaudhuri GIDF Planman Consulting Business & Economy 4Ps Business & Marketing The Sunday Indian The Daily Indian Kkoooljobs.com
